



EuropaInstitut

AN DER UNIVERSITÄT ZÜRICH

Assoziiertes Institut der Universität Zürich & Kooperationspartner der ETH Zürich
RECHT BERATUNG WEITERBILDUNG

Editors:

Andreas Kellerhals, Tobias Baumgartner, Corinne Reber

European Integration Perspectives in Times of Global Crises

13th Network Europe Conference
Athens, 19 – 22 June 2022



EuropaInstitut

AN DER UNIVERSITÄT ZÜRICH

Assoziiertes Institut der Universität Zürich & Kooperationspartner der ETH Zürich
RECHT BERATUNG WEITERBILDUNG

Publisher:

Prof. Dr. Andreas Kellerhals, Dr. Tobias Baumgartner, Corinne Reber

European Integration Perspectives in Times of Global Crises

13th Network Europe Conference

Athens, 19 – 22 June 2022

EIZ  Publishing



European Integration Perspectives in Times of Global Crises by Andreas Kellerhals; Tobias Baumgartner; and Corinne Reber is licensed under a [Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License](https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), except where otherwise noted.

© 2023 – CC BY-NC-ND (Book), CC-BY-SA (Text)

Editors: Prof. Dr. Andreas Kellerhals, Dr. Tobias Baumgartner, Corinne Reber – Europa Institut an der Universität Zürich

Publisher: EIZ Publishing (<https://eizpublishing.ch>)

Layout & Production: buch & netz (<https://buchundnetz.com>)

ISBN:

978-3-03805-567-9 (Print – Softcover)

978-3-03805-568-6 (PDF)

978-3-03805-569-3 (ePub)

DOI: <https://doi.org/10.36862/eiz-567>

Version: 1.01-20230331

This work is available in print and various digital formats in **OpenAccess**. Additional information is available at: <https://eizpublishing.ch/publikationen/european-integration-perspectives-in-times-of-global-crises/>.

Preface

The history of European integration is characterized by a multitude of achievements, but also by challenges and crises. The construction of the European Union as a supranational organization has often raised complex legal questions, especially about the scope of the Union's competences and the remaining competences of the member states. There have also often been controversial discussions about the core of national constitutions, most recently, for example, in connection with the judicial reforms in Poland.

With the White Paper on the Future of Europe, the European Commission had launched a debate on fundamental reforms of the Union structures in 2017. A total of five reform scenarios ranged from a reduction and focusing of the Union's competences to increased integration in the sense of a United States of Europe. However, the White Paper did not have any consequences; none of the reform scenarios presented was implemented. However, current global challenges in the areas of health, climate change and energy resources as well as the shift in the global balance of power and related security issues demonstrate the increasing importance of a strong and united Europe. The idea of an "ever closer union", as laid down in the preamble of the 1992 EU Treaty, could experience a renaissance.

Against this background, the 13th Network Europe Conference addressed the importance of the integration project in times of global crises and the challenges in various policy areas, as well as the EU's relations with its eastern and southern neighbors and its role vis-à-vis global actors such as China and Russia. This publication contains the conference contributions.

Zurich, 20 February 2023

Prof. Dr. Andreas Kellerhals
Dr. Tobias Baumgartner
RA Corinne Reber

Authors

Prof. em. Dr. MICHAEL AMBÜHL, ETH Zurich, Switzerland, Ambühl Meier AG

Dr. JELENA CERANIC PERISIC, Institute for Comparative Law, Belgrade, Serbia

Dr. VIOREL CIBOTARU, Director, European Institute for Political Studies, Moldova

Dr. CHRISTELLE GENOUD, King's College London, England

Prof. Dr. IRIS GOLDNER LANG, University of Zagreb, Croatia

Prof. Dr. CHRISTOS V. GORTSOS, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, Greece

NORA MEIER, ETH Zurich, Switzerland, Ambühl Meier AG

Prof. Dr. PETER CHRISTIAN MÜLLER-GRAFF, Ruprecht-Karls-Universität, Heidelberg, Germany

Prof. Dr. EVA PILS, King's College London, England

Dr. CLARA PORTELA, University of Valencia, Spain

Prof. Dr. PETER R. RODRIGUES, Leiden University, Netherlands

Table of Contents

“Ever closer Union” or flexible Union? Integration Scenarios after Constitutional Court Decisions in Germany and Poland	11
<i>Prof. Dr. PETER CHRISTIAN MÜLLER-GRAFF</i>	
Reform scenarios for EU migration and asylum policy in light of new refugee movements	25
<i>Prof. Dr. PETER R. RODRIGUES</i>	
‘Laws of Fear’ in the EU: Precautionary Principle and Public Health Restrictions to Free Movement of Persons in the Time of COVID-19	39
<i>Prof. Dr. IRIS GOLDNER LANG</i>	
The Changing Nature of CFSP Sanctions: Evolution and Assessment	73
<i>Dr. CLARA PORTELA</i>	
The War in Ukraine and Europe: A Situational Analysis and Negotiation Perspectives	89
<i>Prof. Dr. MICHAEL AMBÜHL, NORA MEIER</i>	
Future of the Economic and Monetary Union	99
<i>Prof. Dr. CHRISTOS V. GORTSOS</i>	
Western Balkans – Integration perspectives	121
<i>Dr. JELENA CERANIC PERISIC</i>	
Moldova’s Aspirations to the EU – A Small Country with a Big Heart	139
<i>Dr. VIOREL CIBOTARU</i>	
Confronting China, looking in the mirror: reflections on human rights and the rule of law in EU-China relations	147
<i>Dr. CHRISTELLE GENOUD, Prof. Dr. EVA PILS</i>	

The War in Ukraine and Europe: A Situational Analysis and Negotiation Perspectives

Michael Ambühl/Nora Meier

Table of Contents

I.	Introduction	89
II.	Game Theoretical Analysis	90
	1. Chicken Game	90
	2. Salgina Game	90
III.	Conflict Ripeness	93
IV.	Negotiation Content	94
	1. Bilateral Agreements (UA – RU)	94
	2. Security Guarantees (Allies – UA)	96
	3. Multilateral Initiatives	97
V.	Conclusions	98

I. Introduction

For many, Russia's brutal war of aggression on Ukraine came as a surprise, either because the likelihood of an attack was dismissed fundamentally or because it was not expected on this scale. The shock – even after several months of open hostilities – still runs deep and the respect for the Ukrainian people, the military and the government, who have presented a resolute and united front against the aggressor since the beginning of the war remains high. It is probably not least due to this spirit of resistance that Ukraine – contrary to Putin's initial expectations – has been able to hold its ground so far. However, given the ongoing duration of the war, the large-scale destruction of the country and the increasing number of casualties, it is worth considering ways out of this situation. This requires deliberation and the weighing of strategies and outcomes.

II. Game Theoretical Analysis

1. Chicken Game

To outline these underlying processes, we begin with a game-theoretical analysis based on the so-called *Chicken Game*. Such an analysis enables a thorough examination of the situation and in doing so provides insights into the conflict. In the Chicken Game, two cars are racing towards each other on a narrow road. Each driver can either swerve or keep racing. Both strategies are undesirable however: (i) swerving first results in being labeled a coward (or “chicken”) or (ii) to keep racing – hoping, the other one swerves first – means both will end up dying. Consequently, it does not pay off for either party to even enter this game.

However, what to do if the game has already started and the cars are bumper to bumper? Such a situation requires a modification of the Chicken Game. We consider three strategies for each of the two drivers: (i) continue to push, (ii) swerve, or (iii) stop pushing to find a way out together. In the following section, we will apply this starting point to the war in Ukraine. We call the newly designed game “*Salgina Game*” in reference to the Salginatobel bridge in the Prättigau in Eastern Switzerland.¹ It is a single-lane bridge, where crossing is also not possible but where swerving – in contrast to the Chicken Game – ends deadly, namely in a fatal fall of 90 meters into the canyon.

2. Salgina Game

The two drivers – representing Russia and Ukraine – face each other in the middle of the single-lane bridge. In analogy to the above three strategies, both can either: (i) *fight* (continue to push), (ii) *surrender* (swerve) or (iii) *negotiate* (stop pushing to find a way out together). This results in a matrix of a total of nine (32) possible combinations of strategies or outcomes. While all nine combinations are theoretically possible, some are more likely than others. For both countries, each of the nine combinations is evaluated independently – from what is perceived as *their* point of view – on a scale of 1-9. The combination that represents the worst outcome for a state receives 1 point (lowest individual pay-off). The best outcome is assigned 9 points (highest individual pay-off).

¹ It is 90 m high and 133 m long and was designed by Swiss civil engineer Robert Maillart, built between 1929 and 1930. Due to its unique design, the «American Society of Civil Engineers» declared the Salginatobel bridge an «International Historic Civil Engineering Landmark» in 1991, available at: <<https://www.salginatobelbridge.com>>.

It is not the goal of the model to indicate what the actors should ideally do. We describe the decision-making situation of the parties. Thus, it is not a normative model, but a descriptive one. The analysis leads to the following:

Ukraine achieves the highest individual payoff (9) if it continues to fight while Russia surrenders (AB). The opposite is true for Russia (BA). In both cases however, one wins only if the other suffers a complete defeat (1). In reality, these two cases (AB and BA) represent the achievement of the maximum goals declared by the two parties. For Ukraine, this is the expulsion of Russian troops from its entire territory (AB) and for Russia, it is the occupation of all of Ukraine (BA). In our opinion, neither of these maximum goals seems feasible, at least not in the near future. For one, regardless of what international law says, Russia is likely not willing to give up Crimea. In addition to its higher strategic importance, Crimea has been more strongly integrated into the Russian Federation than, for instance, the Donbass. And at the same time, we believe that Ukraine cannot rely on endless, unconditional support of the West in

		Russia		
		fight	surrender	negotiate
Ukraine	fight	$\underline{5} \quad \underline{5}$ [Nash 1] (AA) [Pareto inferior]	$\underline{9} \quad 1$ (AB)	$7 \quad 4$ (AC)
	surrender	$1 \quad \underline{9}$ (BA)	$3 \quad 3$ (BB)	$2 \quad 6$ (BC)
	negotiate	$4 \quad 7$ (CA)	$6 \quad 2$ (CB)	$8 \quad \underline{8}$ [Nash 2] (CC) [Pareto]

establishing the pre-2014 borders as Russia's nuclear arsenal ultimately prevents the Western supply of heavy weaponry needed for this purpose.² For the other, Russia lacks the military, political and economic capacity to fully invade Ukraine. Thus – our hypothesis – in reality, AB and BA do not seem as probable outcomes.

If both continue to fight (AA, 5 each), it results in what is known as a *Nash equilibrium*, meaning that neither Ukraine nor Russia can gain anything if it alone changed its strategy.³ We call the equilibrium in (AA) *Nash equilibrium 1* [Nash 1]. AA is not a so-called *Pareto optimum* (in which neither party can improve their outcome *without* worsening the outcome for the other); it is *Pareto inferior*. AA can only be improved for both, if Ukraine and Russia started to negotiate (CC, 8 each). The strategy combination CC is also a Nash equilibrium – *Nash equilibrium 2* [Nash 2]. However, on the contrary to AA, this is a *Pareto optimum*.⁴ As we argue that neither Ukraine nor Russia will achieve their maximum goals (9), joint negotiations (CC) thus have the highest realistic individual (8) as well as highest collective pay-off (16). From that perspective, negotiations would therefore be in the interest of both parties. The game theoretical analysis shows nicely the “Salgina Dilemma”. Both parties are currently in AA, a Nash equilibrium. No one wants to leave *unilaterally* such an equilibrium situation as they would worsen their respective situation (going down from 5 to 1 or to 4). They can both improve their situation only by *jointly* moving to CC. By doing so, they would benefit from a Pareto improvement. This in contrast to the so-called *Prisoner's Dilemma*, in which the departure from the Nash equilibrium also constitutes a Pareto improvement, but in which the new situation is not a (stable) Nash equilibrium. So much for the game-theoretical analysis. The more practical considerations follow below.

² Hence, ironically enough, here nuclear weapons have become “enablers” rather than “pre-venters” as was their original goal. A NATO membership of Ukraine – and thus a direct involvement of the West due to the mutual defense clause – does not seem to be a possible scenario in the near future.

³ The Nash equilibrium is named after mathematician John Nash, see Osborne, Martin J./Rubinstein, Ariel, *A Course in Game Theory*, Cambridge/London 1994.

⁴ Osborne/Rubinstein, pp. 14-29.

III. Conflict Ripeness

When is it time to negotiate? According to William Zartman, this is a question of conflict ripeness.⁵ The latter is not given until the parties find it more effective to pursue their goals through negotiations than through other means. Before a conflict is ripe, military enforcement is often used to achieve a certain goal. Conflict ripeness can be influenced externally and internally.

We argue that in the context of the war in Ukraine, the willingness of both to negotiate (CC) must be preceded by the recognition that achieving their maximum goals (AB, BA) might not be possible in the short term and that pursuing them against better judgement comes at too high a price (civilly, politically, and economically).⁶ With this recognition, the parties will start to negotiate. Without it, negotiations will not take place. The West, too, can influence this readiness from the outside. By means of (i) maintaining and tightening sanctions against Russia, (ii) continuing with arms supply for Ukraine to improve their negotiation position and prevent a Russian annexation. However, it should also (iii) create opportunities to prepare the ground for negotiations.

After horrific incidents and illegal acts of war (such as Bucha, Isjum, and the annexations of the four Ukrainian territories), it is often argued that negotiations are no longer possible. Three reasons in particular are frequently put forward as justification for this, which will be invalidated below. (i) It is suggested that negotiations cannot be conducted with parties who act in violation of international law or are untrustworthy. However, in difficult situations, a party should consider to negotiate even with the devil.⁷ A postponement of actually opportune negotiations due to some (albeit blatant) misconduct on the part of the other party, may be detrimental to one's own interests. And if the other side cannot be trusted, appropriate countermeasures must be formulated in the event of non-compliance with the negotiated agreement. The less trust there is, the more severe these countermeasures must be designed. (ii) Furthermore, it is often argued that engaging in negotiations after such events is too weak a reaction vis-à-vis a violation of international law. However, from a general point of view, negotiations do not need to be seen as "already a first concession". In cleverly prepared and skillfully conducted negotiations accompanied by flanking measures, better results can be achieved than on the battlefield. (iii) Finally, a decision to negotiate is often presented as irreversible.

⁵ Zartman I., William, Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond, in: Stern/Druckman (eds.), *International Conflict Resolution after the Cold War*, Washington 2000, pp. 225-245.

⁶ The assessment of when a price is too high is a difficult consideration. Depending on the party, the individual aspects are also weighted differently.

⁷ Mnookin H., Robert, *Bargaining with the Devil*, New York 2010.

This is not the case. In particular the stronger party has the option of returning to the battlefield at any time – even during negotiations, should no satisfactory compromise emerge. Thus, nothing seems lost by attempting to negotiate; on the contrary, it is an opportunity to limit the damage of war, at least temporarily.

To this end, the United Nations (UN) would theoretically provide a framework for dialogue. However, its core body, the UN Security Council (UNSC) – responsible for ensuring international peace and security – is blocked by Russia's veto-right. An alternative platform to promote diplomacy is therefore necessary and should be proposed, ideally by an international actor with high credibility and a certain authority.

IV. Negotiation Content

As soon as the parties come to the conclusion that it is no longer worthwhile for them to pursue their goals militarily, negotiations will ensue. In the following section, possible elements of such a diplomatic solution are discussed. These elements are structured around three main parts.

i. Bilateral Agreements (UA – RU)

The first part consists of two bilateral agreements between Ukraine and Russia, (i) a *ceasefire agreement* and (ii) a *political settlement*. In our view, the former should also include a definition of the line of control and the modalities of an international monitoring process to keep track of any violations. More comprehensive elements and modalities of living in the same neighborhood would then have to be negotiated in the *political settlement agreement*. The focus here would arguably be on *neutrality* and on *autonomy* of certain Ukrainian regions. As a contribution to peace and stability in the region, Ukraine could agree to a declaration that would provide for an *armed* but not necessarily *permanent neutrality*. In our opinion, the declaration could include a provision that would provide for the terms of reference to be periodically reviewed. This would take into account that the concept of neutrality serves a specific purpose in a particular context. It is not to be understood as an end in itself and the neutrality declaration should therefore be designed in a way that it can be adapted to changing circumstances. The advantages of such a flexible approach can be demonstrated by looking at Switzerland's 200-year history of neutrality. For instance, Switzerland opened its airspace for the overflight of a peacekeeping mission during the Bosnian war in 1995 and is currently participating in sanctions against Russia. A rigid understanding of neutrality would

not have allowed for such actions. Similarly, the inclusion of monitoring would leave open the possibility for Ukraine to abandon its (previously imposed) neutrality status should Russia's position – concerning NATO's eastward expansion – change in the future.

In addition to neutrality, the question of *autonomy* of certain Ukrainian territories would likely have to be discussed in the context of a political settlement. By offering levels of autonomy with increased minority rights for Russian speaking areas (e.g., political, cultural, linguistic), Ukraine could show some flexibility without prematurely sacrificing any territory, as demanded by Russia. This would allow Ukraine to enter the negotiations in a face-saving manner, primarily vis-à-vis its own population. In our opinion, the content of an autonomy debate would particularly include questions of (i) *state structure and the division of competences*, as well as (ii) *individual degrees of autonomy and self-determination rights*.

In terms of *state structure*, there are two distinct forms: federalist and unitary systems. On one hand, *federalism* is based on the division of state tasks between different political levels (a central unit and various subunits). In addition to the vertical separation of powers, the advantage of such a system is the ability to protect minorities, which despite diversity in an overall state, allows for integration and unity. Thus, for instance, appropriate status – including territorial sovereignty – may be granted to minorities forming a majority in a subunit. On the other hand, in a *unitary state*, state power lies with a central government only. The latter delegates certain competencies to political subunits and orders the implementation of decisions made at the central level. This tends to make the consideration of specifics of the population more difficult.⁸

Regarding the identification of the *degrees of autonomy*, there are various existing models along the spectrum of the internal dimension of the right of self-determination that could be consulted for inspiration (e.g. Greenland and South Tyrol).⁹ This means that none of these models violates the principle of territorial integrity of the parent state. However, at the same time, they take into account the specifics of their own population and grant the minorities –

⁸ This does not imply however, that autonomy does not exist in unitary state. *Hausteiner, Eva Marlene*, Föderation als Bundesstaat? Begriffliche Traditionen, politische Alternativen, in: *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte (APuZ)*, bpb 2015, pp. 3-8.

⁹ *Ackrén, Maria*, The Political Parties in Greenland and Their Development, in: *Hänni/Belser/Waldmann, States Falling Apart?* Bern 2015, pp. 317-335; *Alber, Elisabeth*, Qualified Autonomy vs. Secessionist Discourses in Europe: The Case of South Tyrol, in *Hänni/Belser/Waldmann, States Falling Apart?* Bern 2015, pp. 267-296.

based on their right to self-determination – a way to exercise their political and cultural rights.¹⁰ If such autonomy models were ever to include higher levels of self-determination, e.g. a secession, there might be some advantages to an implementation in a federal state structure.¹¹

To that end, aside from its federal system and direct democratic voting devices, Switzerland has gained valuable conflict management experience with the secession of the so-called Jura region from the Canton of Berne (federal subunit). The resolution of this conflict ultimately involved the design of a three-stage process that would guarantee for a maximum number of affected individuals to exercise their right to self-determination.¹² Although different circumstances, comparing notes could thus be useful.

2. Security Guarantees (Allies – UA)

The second part of a diplomatic solution could then focus on *security guarantees* and would be adopted between Ukraine and its allies, for instance, the Ukraine Defense Contact Group¹³ (“Ramstein Group”). Without the latter, the political settlement above would likely have little value, as was the case with previous agreements (Budapest 1994, Minsk 2015). Russian consent in this regard is not only not necessary, but irrelevant. The biggest guarantee for Ukraine would be NATO accession. However, membership in the Western military alliance is unlikely in the near future. On one hand, this is due to Russia’s strong rejection of NATO’s eastward expansion. On the other hand, following an admission of Ukraine, NATO members would be obligated to provide military assistance to Ukraine under the principle of collective security (Art. 5 of NATO Treaty) in case of an attack.¹⁴ A direct confrontation between NATO and Russia – two nuclear powers – would thus no longer be inconceivable.

Therefore, we would suggest for the security guarantees to include a politico-economic (non-military) equivalent to Art. 5 of the NATO Treaty. Such a provision could assume a substitute function for a currently unfeasible NATO membership with the purpose to clearly outline the consequences of breach-

¹⁰ UN or OSCE-managed referendum could be considered to implement such models.

¹¹ Burgess, Michael, *Divided We Stand; Autonomy or Secession in Federation?*, in: Hänni/Belser/Waldmann, *States Falling Apart?* Bern 2015, pp. 15-35.

¹² Maggetti-Waser, Maurizio/Fang-Bär, Alexandra, *The Birth of a New Canton: An Example for the Implementation of the Right to Self-Determination*, in: Hänni/Belser/Waldmann, *States Falling Apart?* Bern 2015, pp. 337-368.

¹³ This group was established in April 2022 on the German air base in Ramstein, available at: <<https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3007229/>>.

¹⁴ See: <https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm>.

ing the political settlement agreement. Implications would have to be severe enough to prevent future misconduct: a mechanism that would automatically lead to the re-installment or toughening of previous sanctions in the event of treaty violations (“snapback”). Inspired by the provision in the 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran (“Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action”).¹⁵ Also included in the security guarantee agreement could be plans for the reconstruction of Ukraine.

3. Multilateral Initiatives

Finally, in a third part, we would propose for new *multilateral initiatives* to reform two important security frameworks. First, a new European security architecture is needed – to be based on a renewed set of rules to reinforce peaceful coexistence on the European continent. Negotiations on these rules could take place at a multilateral conference, a sort of “Helsinki 2” inspired by the Helsinki Conference on security and cooperation in Europe in 1975, during which the participating states formulated ten principles governing their relations and cooperation in various areas. For a relaunch, neutral Switzerland may be considered as a potential venue, since after its recent decision to join NATO, Finland may no longer be an acceptable host country to all.

Second, as indicated above, the UNSC’s inability to act brings into focus the need for reform of the UN’s collective security system, in particular, a change of the veto right of the five permanent UNSC members (P5). Their joint lack of interest in the abolition of their own privileges has been demonstrated many times before. The difficulty of such a possible reform is therefore predictable. However, in the past, successful changes in the international system have always been implemented after wars: the end of the Thirty Years War in 1648 brought the Westphalian system, which laid the basis for the fundamental principle of “sovereign equality of states”; the end of the Napoleonic wars in 1815 allowed the creation of a balance of power, the end of World War I brought the establishment of the League of Nations; and the end of World War II brought the founding of the UN. Russia’s war in Ukraine could thus also prove to be an opportunity. If not for a comprehensive reform, then at least to restart the debate. The fact that the aggressor in a war can block the very system responsible for guaranteeing international peace and security should be sufficient cause. A restriction of the use of the veto right should be reached in the minimum.

¹⁵ See: <https://www.eeas.europa.eu/sites/default/files/iran_joint-comprehensive-plan-of-action_en.pdf>.

V. Conclusions

There is a war going on in Europe. The defense of Ukraine against Russia's illegal attack is therefore also a European matter that requires a strong united response from the West, in particular from Europe. By means of sanctions and arms deliveries, Ukraine can be indirectly and directly supported in improving its negotiation position.

Naturally, it is not possible to anticipate future developments in this war. For one, we cannot know if Ukraine can maintain its current [end of November 2022] military success. For the other, the use of nuclear weapons (although unlikely) by Putin cannot be ruled out, in particular in case he should feel pushed to the wall and come under pressure domestically. Thus, even if these and other future developments are not foreseeable today, the analysis and reflections presented here could serve as a contribution to preparing the grounds for a dialogue and possible negotiations down the line.

Zuletzt erschienene Bände bei EIZ Publishing, Zürich

- Band 213 **Hotspots des Sanierungsrechts**
12. Fachtagung zur Sanierung und Insolvenz von Unternehmen –
Tagungsband 2021
THOMAS SPRECHER (Hrsg.), mit Beiträgen von Linus Cathomas, Hubert Gmünder,
Daniel P. Oehri, Marina Schwizer, Roman Sturzenegger, Alexander von Jeinsen,
2022 – CHF 39.90.
- Band 214 **Jahrbuch Wirtschaftsrecht Schweiz – EU**
Überblick und Kommentar 2021/2022
ANDREAS KELLERHALS/TOBIAS BAUMGARTNER (Hrsg.), mit Beiträgen von Hansjürg
Appenzeller, Tobias Baumgartner, Benjamin Bergau, André S. Berne, Eliane
Braun, Alexander Brunner, Janick Elsener, Jana Fischer, Thomas Geiser, Ulrike I.
Heinrich, Vanessa Isler, Brigitta Kratz, David Mamane, Michael Mayer, Peter
Rechsteiner, René Schreiber, Stefan Sulzer, Dirk Trüten, Wesselina Uebe,
Andreas R. Ziegler, Laura P. Zilio, 2022 – CHF 49.90.
- Band 215 **Europa in turbulenten Zeiten**
Referate zu Fragen der Zukunft Europas 2020/21
ANDREAS KELLERHALS (Hrsg.), mit Referaten von Jean Asselborn, Tatevik
Baghdassarian, Michel Barnier, Paul Bulcke, Bundesrat Ignazio Cassis, Michail
Chodorkowski, Prof. Kathleen Claussen, Dr. Henri Gétaz,
Bundesverfassungsrichter Prof. Dr. Peter M. Huber, Prof. Michael Ignatieff,
Prof. Dr. Günter Krings, Dr. Romeo Lacher, S.D. Erbprinz Alois von und zu
Liechtenstein, Michel M. Liès, Petros Mavromichalis, Prof. Dr. Nils Melzer,
Ambassador Jacques Pitteloud, Hon. Jed S. Rakoff, Dr. Norbert Riedel, Dr. Artem
Rybchenko, 2022 – CHF 49.90.
- Band 216 **30 Jahre Europa Institut an der Universität Zürich**
Auswahl öffentlicher Vorträge aus den letzten 30 Jahren
ANDREAS KELLERHALS (Hrsg.), mit Referaten von Hon. Samuel Alito, Lord Paddy
Ashdown, Hon. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, The Rt Hon John Bercow MP, The Rt Hon
Tony Blair, Zoran Djindjic, Dr. Andrzej Duda, Joachim Gauck, Dr. Peter
Gauweiler, Dr. Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, Dr. Gregor
Gysi, Jean-Claude Juncker, Dr. Helmut Kohl, Prof. Dr. Norbert Lammert, Enrico
Letta, Michel M. Liès, Friedrich Merz, Adolf Muschg, Jean-Claude Trichet, Lord
Christopher Patten of Barnes, Prof. Dr. Romano Prodi, Hon. Jed S. Rakoff,
Anders Fogh Rasmussen, Mark Rutte, Hon. Antonin Scalia, Herman Van
Rompu, Fürst Hans-Adam II. von und zu Liechtenstein, Dr. Richard Freiherr
von Weizsäcker, Prof. Dr. Andreas Voßkuhle, 2022 – CHF 49.90.
- Band 217 **Gefährdung durch psychisch auffällige Personen**
Fachtagung Bedrohungsmanagement – Tagungsband 2021
CHRISTIAN SCHWARZENEGGER, REINHARD BRUNNER (Hrsg.), mit Beiträgen von
Lorenz Biberstein, Reinhard Brunner, Ladina Cavelti, Elmar Habermeyer,
Corinne Kauf, Werner Schmid, Catharina Schmidt, Daniel Treuthardt, Andreas
Werner, Ruedi Winet, 2022 – CHF 39.90.

- Band 218 **Jugendliche und junge Erwachsene im urbanen Umfeld als Fokus der Kriminalprävention**
13. Zürcher Präventionsforum – Tagungsband 2022
CHRISTIAN SCHWARZENEGGER, ROLF NÄGELI (Hrsg.), mit Beiträgen von Dirk Baier, Thomas Hestermann, Nicole Holderegger, Bernadette Schaffer, Martina Schneider, Simone Walser, Michael Wirz, Sven Zimmerlin, 2022 – CHF 39.90.
- Band 219 **Aktuelle Herausforderungen und Entwicklungen des Konzernrechts**
Tagung zu Konzernrecht – Tagungsband 2020
ALEXANDER VOGEL (Hrsg.), mit Beiträgen von Christoph B. Bühler, Thomas Geiser, Lukas Glanzmann, Karl Hofstetter, Alexander Vogel, 2022 – CHF 39.90.
- Band 220 **Mergers & Acquisitions in Recht und Praxis**
23. Konferenz zu Mergers & Acquisitions – Tagungsband 2020
HANS-JAKOB DIEM (Hrsg.), mit Beiträgen von Nicolas Birkäuser, Brice Bolinger, Hans-Jakob Diem, Dieter Gericke, Thomas Karg, Marcel Meinhardt, Frank Röhling, Franziska Stadtherr-Glättli, Marco Superina, Philippe A. Weber, 2022 – CHF 39.90.
- Band 221 **Rechnungswesen und Kapitalschutz im Strafrecht**
12. Schweizerische Tagung zum Wirtschaftsstrafrecht – Tagungsband 2021
MARC JEAN-RICHARD-DIT-BRESSEL, DAVID ZOLLINGER (Hrsg.), mit Beiträgen von Lorenz Garland, Lukas Glanzmann, Daniel Holenstein, Marc Jean-Richard-dit-Bressel, Christian Krämer, Stefan Maeder, Nora Markwalder, David Zollinger, 2022 – CHF 39.90.
- Band 222 **Mergers & Acquisitions – Aktuelle Entwicklungen in Recht und Praxis**
24. Züricher Konferenz zu Mergers & Acquisitions – Tagungsband 2021
HANS-JAKOB DIEM (Hrsg.), mit Beiträgen von Daniel Aegerter, Hans-Jakob Diem, Frank Gerhard, Lorenz Lehmann, Alex Nikitine, Patrick Schmidt, 2022 – CHF 39.90.
- Band 223 **A wonderful world: Neue Möglichkeiten, neues Recht, neue Herausforderungen**
8. Tagung zu Private Equity – Tagungsband 2022
DIETER GERICKE (Hrsg.), mit Beiträgen von Valeria Ceccarelli, Dieter Gericke, Nathan Kaiser, Margrit Marti, Frédéric Rochat, Matthias Staehelin, Kevin Vangehr, Christian Wenger, 2022 – CHF 44.90.
- Band 224 **VAG/AVO Revision – Evolution oder Revolution?**
HANSJÜRIG APPENZELLER, MONICA MÄCHLER (Hrsg.), mit Beiträgen von Hansjürg Appenzeller, Daniel Bell, Petra Ginter, Olivier Hirsbrunner, Peter Ch. Hsu, Michel Kähr, Irene Klauer, Monica Mächler, Birgit Rutishauser Hernandez Ortega, Katja Roth Pellanda, Rolf H. Weber, 2023 – CHF 39.90.
- Band 225 **Aktuelle Fragen zum schweizerischen und internationalen Kapitalmarktrecht**
THOMAS U. REUTTER, THOMAS WERLEN (Hrsg.), mit Beiträgen von Olivier Buff, Matthias Courvoisier, Sandro Fehlmann, Daniel Häusermann, Patrick Hünerwadel, Urs Kägi, Camilla Kehler-Weiss, Dominique Müller, Oliver Seiler, Philip Spoerlé, Matthias Tanner, Simon Vorburger, 2023 – CHF 44.90.

Weitere Publikationen und Monografien

Ein Plus für die Demokratie

Minimalstandard für die Mitsprache von Parlament und Volk
beim Rahmenabkommen oder bei weiteren Verträgen mit der EU
THOMAS PFISTERER, 2021 – CHF 44.90/34.90.

Internet Governance at the Point of No Return

ROLF H. WEBER, 2021 – CHF 39.00.

Grundprobleme der Invaliditätsbemessung in der Invalidenversicherung

PHILIPP EGLI, MARTINA FILIPPO, THOMAS GÄCHTER, MICHAEL E. MEIER, 2021 – CHF 54.90/44.90.

Begegnungen

Beiträge von Assistierenden zum 50. Geburtstag von Thomas Gächter
KERSTIN NOELLE VOKINGER, MATTHIAS KRADOLFER, PHILIPP EGLI (Hrsg.), mit Beiträgen von Matthias Appenzeller, Meret Baumann, Petra Betschart-Koller, Brigitte Blum-Schneider, Caroline Brugger Schmidt, Danka Dusek, Philipp Egli, Martina Filippo, Maya Geckeler Hunziker, Kaspar Gerber, Sarah Hack-Leoni, Silvio Hauser, Matthias Kradolfer, Michael E. Meier, Eva Slavik, Jürg Marcel Tiefenthal, Dania Tremp, Thuy Xuan Truong, Dominique Vogt, Kerstin Noëlle Vokinger, 2021 – CHF 49.90/39.90.

«Vielfalt in der Einheit» am Ende?

JÜRIG MARCEL TIEFENTHAL, 2021 – CHF 54.90.

Kommentar zur Schaffhauser Verwaltungsrechtspflege

Verwaltungsrechtspflegegesetz (VRG) – Justizgesetz (JG)

KILIAN MEYER, OLIVER HERRMANN, STEFAN BILGER (Hrsg.), mit Beiträgen von Andreas Baeckert, Cristina Baumgartner-Spahn, Stefan Bilger, Susanne Bollinger, Nina Dajcar, Alfons Fratschöl, Natalie Greh, Nicole Heingärtner, Oliver Herrmann, Natascha Honegger, Basil Hotz, Beat Keller, Arnold Marti, Kilian Meyer, Beatrice Moll, Alexander Rihs, Christian Ritzmann, Patrick Spahn, Beat Sulzberger, Daniel Sutter, Nihat Tektas, Konrad Waldvogel, Dina Weil, 2021 – CHF 79.00/99.00.

Geltungsbereich des Kollektivanlagenrechts

THOMAS JUTZI, DAMIAN SIERADZKI, 2022 – CHF 39.90/59.90.

25 Jahre Kartellgesetz – ein kritischer Ausblick

HENRIQUE SCHNEIDER, ANDREAS KELLERHALS (Hrsg.), mit Beiträgen von Jean-Pierre Bringenhen, Daniel Emch, Andreas Kellerhals, Pranvera Këllezi, Laura Müller, Cristina Schaffner, Henrique Schneider, Markus Saurer, Anne-Cathrine Tanner, Nina Zosso, 2022 – CHF 39.90/59.90.

Der Empfang der Sakramente der Busse, der Eucharistie oder der Krankensalbung durch katholische Gläubige in einer nichtkatholischen Kirche oder kirchlichen Gemeinschaft

Rechtsgeschichtliche Entwicklung der kanonischen Normen
ANDREA G. RÖLLIN, 2022 – CHF 39.90/59.90.

Recht und Evidenz in der Pandemie

Juristische Analysen aus zwei Jahren der Covid-19-Bekämpfung
KASPAR GERBER, 2022 – CHF 39.90/59.90.

Der Beitritt der Schweiz zur Europäischen Union

Voraussetzungen, Verfahren, Ausnahmen, Staatsleitung, Volksrechte
MATTHIAS OESCH, DAVID CAMPI, 2022 – CHF 49.90/69.90.

With the White Paper on the Future of Europe, the European Commission had launched a debate on fundamental reforms of the Union structures in 2017. A total of five reform scenarios ranged from a reduction and focusing of the Union's competences to increased integration in the sense of a United States of Europe. However, the White Paper did not have any consequences; none of the reform scenarios presented was implemented. However, current global challenges in the areas of health, climate change and energy resources as well as the shift in the global balance of power and related security issues demonstrate the increasing importance of a strong and united Europe. The idea of an "ever closer union", as laid down in the preamble of the 1992 EU Treaty, could experience a renaissance. Against this background, the 13th Network Europe Conference addressed the importance of the integration project in times of global crises and the challenges in various policy areas, as well as the EU's relations with its eastern and southern neighbors and its role vis-à-vis global actors such as China and Russia. This publication contains the conference contributions.

With contributions from:

Michael Ambühl
Jelena Ceranic Perisic
Viorel Cibotaru
Christelle Genoud
Christos V. Gortsos
Iris Goldner Lang

Nora Meier
Peter Christian Müller-Graff
Eva Pils
Clara Portela
Peter R. Rodrigues